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Sadie Bond* Psychiatric Evidence of Sexual
Assault Victims: The Need for
Fundamental Change in the
Determination of Relevance
Introduction
What follows is a discussion of the use of evidence of the complainant's
psychiatric history in sexual assault trials. I will argue that the introduc-
tion of this evidence is sought mainly for the purpose of discrediting the
complainant's testimony, as part of an "attack the victim" strategy. The
admissibility of this evidence as relevant is the product of unfounded
myths and sex-biased, if not misogynist, views about women. This
evidence is rarely, if ever, relevant and its minimal probative value is, in
most cases, far outweighed by its potential for exacerbating or perpetu-
ating sex bias in the sexual assault trial. I will argue that the rationale for
admitting such evidence in the name of a fair trial for the accused is
flawed. Moreover, the victim and society have a legitimate interest in a
trial based on relevant evidence rather than myth and this interest is
worthy of protection.
In this paper I argue that the introduction of evidence of the
complainant's psychiatric history in a sexual assault trial should be
restricted. This argument requires an exploration of truths and myths
regarding sexual assault. Part I paints the backdrop against which the
following discussion must be read. It points to the gendered nature of the
crime of sexual assault as sexual violence and considers the characteriza-
tion of the sexual assault trial as a "credibility contest." Part II is an
excavation of myths about women- about women's psychological make-
up, women's sexuality and sexual assault. These myths are not distinct
from one another. On the contrary, they are interconnected and form a
powerful interpretive construct. This construct supports, and is perpetu-
ated by, institutional and legal responses to women in general, and
women as sexual assault victims in particular. Part ImI presents a brief
discussion of sex bias within the traditional disciplines of psychiatry and
psychology.' Part IV considers what little caselaw there is on the
* LL.B. 1994 (Dalhousie). This paper received the 1993 J.S.D. Tory Writing Competition
Award. The author would like to thank Professor Archie Kaiser of Dalhousie for his invaluable
guidance with this project.
1. While I recognize that the two disciplines are distinct, psychology and psychiatry will be
treated together in this paper.
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admissibility of psychiatric evidence of complainants and witnesses.
Fundamental principles of relevance, probative value and the fair trial are
discussed in Part V. Finally, I conclude that to avoid the dangers inherent
in the use of victim psychiatric history evidence there must be a funda-
mental change in judicial determinations of relevance.
PART I: Sexual Assault and the Institutional Response
A. The Crime
The recognition of the unique character of the crime of sexual assault is
crucial to the discussion of the use of psychiatric evidence relating to the
complainant in trials of sexual assault. The gendered and sexual nature of
the crime underlies and conditions the societal, institutional and legal
response to the sexual assault complainant. It is at the core of understand-
ing the response of the justice system when a woman reports a sexual
assault, and when she testifies at trial.
Despite changes in sexual assault legislation that have de-gendered the
crime of rape and given "women the legal right to be charged with rape
and men the legal right to be victims",2 the fact remains that rape is a
gendered crime. Women are raped because they are women. Sexual
assault is not an "act of passion"; it is an expression of "power and
hostility."3 It is a "sex-based crime, the only crime in which men are the
offenders'and women the victims."4 Indeed, sexual assault is an aggres-
sive act against women as women.' That 99% of those charged with
sexual assault are male and 90% of the victims are female6 is no accident.
Sexual assault is the product of a sex-unequal society. Indeed, sexual
assault can be seen as a mechanism by which men maintain dominance
over women and exclusive control of political, economic and social
power. Brownmiller identifies rape as "nothing more or less than a
conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a
2. E. Shilton and A. Derrick, "Sexual Equality and Sexual Assault: In the Aftermath of
Seaboyer" (1991), 11 Windsor Y.B. Access Justice 107 at 112.
3. Gunn & Minch, infra, note 10 at 47.
4. M. Torrey, "When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape
Prosecutions" (1991), 24 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 1013 at 1059.
5. Ibid., at 1061.
6. Ibid. Other studies suggest that 91% of offenders are male. See Gender Equality in the
Justice System (Vancouver: Law Society of British Columbia, 1992) at 7-68.
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state of fear.' 7 Sexual assault is aform of social control that keeps women
in their place.'
MoreoVer, the sexual nature of the crime cannot be denied. Sexual
assault is sexualized violence. In 1983 legislative reforms removed the
crime of rape from the Criminal Code and replaced it with sexual assault.9
This change was clearly an effort to point to the violent nature of the
offence. 10 Although this effort is laudable, it failed to give full legal
recognition to the nature of the crime. In renaming rape as sexual assault,
the law suggests that it is an assault with a sexual motivation, or of a sexual
nature." It separates the violence from its sexual nature and fails to point
to the fact that in sexual assault, the two are one and the same. That is,
sexual assault is not sex accompanied by an assault but sexual contact as
an assault; it is not sex accompanied by violence, but sexual contact that
is violence.
B. The Trial
Sexual assault is the product of the unequal division of power along sex
lines in our society. The law of sexual assault "inevitably treads on the
explosive ground of sex roles, of male aggression and female passivity
[powerlessness], of our understandings of sexuality"' 2 and of the sex
inequality of our society. The introduction of evidence of a complainant's
psychiatric history in a sexual assault trial both reflects and perpetuates
the mythology that surrounds and determines the justice system's re-
sponse to the sexual assault complaint.
The sexual assault trial, and the institutional response to the sexual
assault complainant, have been characterized as a "second rape."' 3 This
second victimization may be attributed to the historical and current
perception of the crime of sexual assault and is the direct result of distrust
and suspicion of the complainant's veracity. The introduction of psychi-
atric history evidence is founded upon this distrust.
7. S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975) at 15.
8. L. Clark and D. Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality (Toronto: The Women's
Press, 1977) at 28-29. See Also G.D. LaFree,Rape and the CriminalJustice System: The Social
Construction of SexualAssault (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1989) at 50.
9. C. Boyle, SexualAssault (Toronto: Carswell, 1984), at 53.
10. Ibid. See also R. Gunn and C. Minch, SexualAssault: The Dilemma of Disclosure, The
Question of Conviction (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1988) at 101.
11. Supra, note 9.
12. S. Estrich, "Rape" in Mary Joe Frug, Women and the Law (Westbury, N.Y.: The
Foundation Press, 1992) at 764.
13. L. Madigan & N. Gamble, The SecondRape: Society's Continued Betrayal of the Victim
(New York: Lexington Books, 1989).
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It is widely believed that the victimizing nature of the sexual assault
trial is the inevitable result of the peculiarly private nature of the crime.
LaFree suggests:
[B]ecause rape cases rarely include eyewitnesses, processing is often
reduced to direct confrontation between accuser and accused. ... [A] two
party confrontation in which each party insists on a different reconstruc-
tion of an event is likely to be highly ambiguous. Without eyewitnesses
processing may depend less on an assessment of whether a rape has
occurred than on a perception of whether the victim and the assailant are
the kind of people who could have been involved. 4 [Emphasis in the
original.]
While a lack of eyewitness, or any other "independent" evidence may
result in a direct confrontation between the accuser and the accused, this
does not fully explain the traumatic nature of the sexual assault trial for
the victim.
Brownmiller notes that the rape trial is often an "oath against oath"
situation.15 She points out, however, that there are many instances when
a jury is required to deal with an oath against oath situation and must
decide a case based on who it has decided to trust.16 The difference with
sexual assault, she claims, is that the victim is female and the offender is
male and that the offence is one that involves a "deliberate distortion of
the primal act of sexual intercourse."' 7 As a result "man's law has sought
to measure such relative, qualitative and interrelated concepts as moral
character, force, fear, consent, will and resistance" in order to ensure that
a crime was actually committed. 8
Moreover, as MacCrimmon points out, despite the "fear that the trial
will be a credibility contest between the victim and the accused, there is
some evidence that this is not the case."'19 She suggests that, in fact, sexual
assault trials are no more likely than nonsexual assault trials to entail the
word of the victim against the word of the accused. In addition, eyewit-
ness evidence is presented in the defence of rape charges more often than
in many other offenses such as burglary, narcotics offences and drunk
driving. 20 MacCrimmon, thus, rejects the application of special evidence
rules to sexual assault cases.
14. LaFree, supra, note 8 at 27.
15. Brownmiller, supra, note 7 at 368.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., at 369.
18. Ibid.
19. MacCrimmon, "Consistent Statements of a Witness" (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 285,
at 311.
20. Ibid.
420 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Special rules have been applied in sexual assault cases, argues
MacCrimmon, because of "the assumption that the credibility of all
victims of sexual offences is suspect when in reality this depends on the
circumstances of each case."21 The argument in favour of the introduction
of psychiatric history evidence, too, is founded on the belief that the
complainant's credibility is always suspect. This belief is founded upon
the myths and stereotypes that are explored in Part II of this paper.
The nature of the sexual assault trial as a second rape for the victim is
theresult of the institutionalresponse to the sexual assault complaint, and
the woman who makes it, rather than the particular circumstances of the
offence. Indeed, adherence to the notion that the sexual assault trial by its
nature entails a "her word against his" situation obscures reality. If sexual
assault trials are inherently credibility contests, it is not because the
offence is usually committed in private (although that may be true) but
because of the gendered nature of the offence. Because sexual assault is
a crime committed by men against women, the contest is between the
credibility of men as men and the credibility of women as women. This
credibility contest is inherent in the societal division of power along sex
lines.
Furthermore, because sexual assault is a crime of dominance, the
sexual assault trial is a manifestation of that dominance. As Estrich states:
Most of the time, a criminal law that reflects male values and male
standards imposes its judgment on men who have injured other men. It is
"boys' rules" applied to a boys' fight. In rape, the male standard defines
a crime committed against women, and male standards are used not only
to judge men, but also to judge the conduct of women victims.22
The conduct of the victim and thus the credibility of her complaint are
tested by the application of male standards which are dominant in our
legal culture.
In addition, the sexual assault trial is conducted based on the assump-
tion that the accused is particularly vulnerable to false accusations. In
fact, statistics suggest that sexual assault complaints are no more likely
to be false than reports of any other crime. 23 Nevertheless, the law and the
conduct of sexual assault trials are grounded on the fear of false accusa-
tions. Edwards states: "Whilst the statutory provisions relating to rape
21. MacCrimmon, supra, note 19 at 312.
22. Estrich, supra, note 12 at 764.
23. Torrey, supra, note 4 at 1028.
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have evolved to protect women, procedural rules have evolved with the
protection of the (male) defendant in mind. 2 4 This concern to protect the
accused means that the sexual assault trial becomes the trial of the victim
as much as of the offender.
In this context, the key defence strategy is to discredit the victim. As
the trial focuses on the conduct of the victim at the time of the assault2
or, more generally, on the victim's character and credibility26 defence
counsel will inevitably attack the victim. While undermining the credibil-
ity of the victim is a common tactic of defence lawyers in a variety of
criminal cases, it is more prevalent in rape trials?7 This reality is
recognized by many commentators on sexual assault.28 Sheehy states that
although victim history evidence may be admissible in other criminal
trials, "for no other offence is it introduced so consistently as a basic
feature of the defence, and for no other offence is this sort of evidence
used to harass and intimidate the victim."2 9
An American study found that defence attorneys routinely investigate
the background of the complainant in preparation for trial." It suggests
that since the enactment of rape shield laws that restrict the use of sexual
history evidence, the focus has shifted from sexual history to general
character and reputation. Defence lawyers:
seek information related to the complainant's credibility, character and
general reputation (including whether the complainant has a criminal
record, a history of reporting sexual assaults, or a psychiatric history)."
The preliminary inquiry is often used as a "fishing expedition" for the
same purpose.12
Victim history evidence may be used to suggest that the complainant
is not trustworthy and that, therefore, her testimony should not be
believed. It may also be used to raise or take advantage of antipathy
towards the victim by attacking her character to show that she is a "bad"
person. As Holstrom and Burgess point out:
24. S. Edwards, Female Sexuality and the Law (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981) at 49.
25. Estrich, supra, note 12 at 766.
26. Lynda Lytle Holstrom, The Victim ofRape:InstitutionalReactions (Toronto: John Wiley
and Sons, 1978) at 184.
27. Torrey, supra, note 4 at 1059.
28. See for example Clark and Lewis, supra, note 8 at 47; Holstrom, supra, note 26 at 184;
Torrey, supra, note 4 at 1059; E. Sheehy "Canadian Judges and the Law of Rape: Should the
Charter Insulate Bias?" (1989), 21 Ottawa L.Rev. 741, at 751; Edwards, supra, note 24 at 59.
29. Sheehy, ibid., at 751.
30. J. Marsh, A. Geist & N. Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform (Boston: Auburn
House Publishing Co, 1982) at 55. See also Holstrom, supra, note 26 at 184.
31. Ibid. Emphasis added.
32. Gunn & Minch, supra, note 10 at 70.
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A multitude of things can be used to discredit the rape victim's general
character. Indeed, almost anything other than completely proper and
respectable behaviour can be used: food stamps, criminal record, mental
problems,psychiatric history, alcohol use, drug use, absence from school,
religious views and vague innuendos.3
As the introduction of the victim's sexual history is now restricted in
Canada by statute,34 the use of psychiatric history evidence is likely to be
seen by defence counsel as an attractive alternative. Moreover, such
evidence will be seen as relevant by trial judges and therefore held
admissible. While the law regarding the admissibility of past sexual
history has changed in Canada, the attitudes that resulted in its admission
in the past have not. These same attitudes will result in the admission of
psychiatric history evidence.
The reasons why such evidence is held to be relevant, and the reasons
why the defence tactic of attacking the victim is successful, are the same.
The supposed relevance of victim history evidence of various kinds is
based on myths regarding women and sexual assault. The success of this
defence strategy is related to the extent to which those myths are widely
believed by judges and jurors alike. As Sheehy states: "Predictably,
victim vilification as a defence has had considerable success in cases
where the victim history evidence can be used to invoke negative
stereotypes."35 Psychiatric history evidence may also be used to invoke
or support negative stereotypes and thus become part of a successful
defence strategy.
My argument is that the introduction of psychiatric history evidence is
sought for the purposes of undermining the credibility of the complain-
ant. This strategy may indeed be successful because mythology continues
to operate in the justice system's response to the sexual assault complaint.
This mythology is explored below.
PART II: Mythology
The operation of rape myths in sexual assault trials was recognized by the
Supreme Court of Canada inR. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme. 6 McLachlin J.,
for the majority, discussed the use of sexual history evidence in sexual
assault trials:
33. Supra, note 26 at 184. Emphasis added.
34. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, as amended by S.C. 1992 c. 38 s. 2., s. 276.
35. Sheehy, supra, note 28 at 774.
36. (1991), 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.) at 134.
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Evidence that the complainant had relations with the accused and others
was routinely presented (and accepted by judges and juries) as tending to
make it more likely that the complainant had consented to the alleged
assault and as undermining her credibility generally. These inferences
were based not on facts, but on the myths that unchaste women were more
likely to consent to intercourse and, in any event, were less worthy of
belief. These twin myths are now discredited .3
If the myths that support a perceived connection between past sexual
conduct, the likelihood of consent and lack of trustworthiness have been
discredited, other myths about sexual assault complaints, and women
who make them, have not. There remains a de facto, if not a legal,
presumption that any given sexual assault complaint is false. This
presumption is rooted in the longstanding myths that hold that women lie
about sex in general and rape in particular, that women fantasize or
hallucinate about rape, and that only "good" women can truly be raped.
Although these myths are interrelated, for the sake of clarity, they will be
considered separately.
A. Myth: Women frequently lie about sexual assault
The ultimate statement of the fabrication myth comes from Wigmore,
whose treatise on evidence, written in the early 1900's, is still influential.
Bienen claims: "If there is a single source of the law's concern with false
reports in sex offence cases, it is Wigmore's doctrine."38 The core of the
Wigmore doctrine is that women and young girls tend to fabricate charges
of sexual assault. Bienen's analysis of the basis for Wigmore's conclu-
sion clearly demonstrate that it is unfounded. However, as Bienen points
out, the influence of Wigmore is ongoing because it reinforces societal
prejudices .39 Wigmore's doctrine may be the definitive legal statement of
the myth but it is by no means the source. The myth has been, and remains
pervasive.
Scholars point out that the source of the myth is an underlying distrust
of women generally. Brownmiller points to the depth and fundamental
nature of this distrust by noting that when female police officers began to
take sexual assault complaints in New York the number of complaints
labelled as false dropped from 15% to 2%. This, Brownmiller claims,
indicates that "women believe the word of other women. Men do not."40
Whether distrust of the sexual assault complainant is because she is a
37. Supra, note 36 at 134.
38. L. Bienen, "A Question of Credibility: John Henry Wigmore's Use of Scientific
Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence" (1983), 19 California Western L. Rev.
235, at 241.
39. Ibid.,at241.
40. Supra, note 7 at 387.
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woman or because her allegation is of a sexual assault is immaterial.
Whatever the basis, the distrust is drawn along gender lines and is deep,
-pervasive, and discriminatory.
The fabrication myth includes two articulations. One is the image of
the "scheming, lying vindictive woman" from whom men must be
protected.4' Woman is seen as "fickle," "filled with malice" and "seeking
revenge on past lovers." 2 This image suggests that the woman is claiming
to have been assaulted as a way of getting back at a man with whom she
is angry.
The second articulation is based on a view of female sexuality as
subject to restrictions external to women themselves. It is the image of the
woman under surveillance:
It is assumed that the female's sexual behaviour, depending on her age, is
under the surveillance of her parents or her husband, and also more
generally of the community. Thus, the defense argues, if a woman says she
was raped it must be because she consented to sex she was not supposed
to have. She got caught, and now wants to get back in the good graces of
whomever's surveillance she is under. A variation is to argue that she was
out later than she was supposed to be, got caught, and needed an excuse for
her tardiness.43
This view suggests that women are unable or unwilling to take responsi-
bility for their sexual behaviour and are willing to make false accusations
in order to keep themselves out of trouble.
Despite the fact that sexual assault complaints are no more likely to be
false than any other offence," a woman who brings a sexual assault
complaint to the justice system encounters profound distrust and hostil-
ity.45 Studies have continued to show high rates of "unfounding" of sexual
assault complaints by police.46 Taylor notes that:
"Although unfounding statistics are often cited as evidence of how
frequently rape victims lie, many reasons that cases are marked unfounded
have nothing to do with false accusations."47
The twin images of the vindictive, spiteful woman and the ashamed,
fearful woman provide officials in the justice system with possible stories
or scenarios in which to ground their distrust and disbelief. Psychiatric
41. Supra, note 7 at 387.
42. Supra, note 26 at 190.
43. Ibid., at 192.
44. Supra, note 4 at 1028.
45. J. Taylor, "Rape and Women's Credibility: Problems of Recantations and False Accusa-
tions Echoed in the Case of Cathleen Crowell Webb and Gary Dotson" (1987), 10 Harvard
Women's L.J. 59 at 60.
46. See Gunn and Minch, supra, note 10 at 56; Clark and Lewis, supra, note 8 at 57, Gender
Equality in the Justice System, supra, note 6 at 7-70.
47. Supra, note 45 at 91.
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history evidence may be introduced by defence counsel to support these
possible scenarios or it may offer other, perhaps more complex, reasons
for a woman's "false accusation." It is important to note that there is no
need for the defence to set out a specific defence of fabrication. Mere
suggestion or innuendo may be sufficient to allow for the operation of the
fabrication myth.
B. Myth: "Bad" women can't be i-aped
As Clark and Lewis point out, whether or not a particular event will be
classified as rape by the criminal justice system-from the police to the
jury-depends very much on the characteristics of the victim.48 "In effect,
the law is saying that some women can be raped and some women
can't.... 49 The judicial system, claim Clark and Lewis, defines certain
women as "open territory"; they are women who are seen as not being
"respectable" and therefore "valueless" and not worthy of the law's
protection. ° The complaints of these women are held to be "unfounded"
by the police at the -first stage in the criminal justice process.
If a complaint does get to the trial stage, the victim-specific definition
of sexual assault will be applied. Susan Edwards points out that:
in the actual process of a rape trial, considerable partiality seems to be
exercised regarding legal protection of a particular victim. For instance,
case law announces its preparedness to protect women who are true
victims of sexual assault. But the complainant is much more likely to
qualify if her behaviour is congruous with the appropriate female sexual
and social role. If it is not, her testimony is far less likely to be regarded with
credulity.5
Deviation from the appropriate female role may be identified in the
victim's behaviour at the time of the event or it may be identified in her
being labelled as deviant in a broader context.
Included among the grounds for "unfounding" identified by Clark and
Lewis, is the victim's "mental state."52 They identify the presence of a
psychiatric history as one of the characteristics that places women outside
that category of protected women.53 The influence of a psychiatric history
on the attitude of the judge is illustrated in an American study on the
effects of rape shield laws. It found that some judges exercise their
48. Clark and Lewis, supra, note 8 at 91.
49. Ibid., at 92.
50. Ibid., at 157.
51. Supra, note 24 at 50.
52. Clark and Lewis, supra, note 8 at 89.
53. Ibid., at 92.
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discretion to admit evidence of past sexual history when the complainant
has a psychiatric history.54 Psychiatric history evidence, then, may be
used to identify the woman as "deviant" and outside the law's sphere of
protection.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the recent case of R. v. Ross. In
Ross, an appeal against a sexual assault conviction was based on fresh
evidence brought forward by the complainant's former psychiatrist. The
decision of the court was reserved and prior to its release the appellant
sought to have the appeal re-opened for the purpose of hearing further
fresh evidence. This further evidence was of the complainant's past
sexual conduct with another person. In its decision, the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal held that the further fresh evidence was admissible, noting that
it tended to bolster the evidence of both Mr. Ross and the psychiatrist. The
appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.
C. Myth: Women fantasize rape
A myth that is clearly connected to the fabrication myth and has particular
significance when considering the use of psychiatric history evidence is
that women fantasize sexual assault. There are two basic premises
underlying this myth. One is that woman's basic psychological make-up
is characterized by a deep psychological need to be overpowered in sex."
The other is that some women are subject to hallucinations or delusions
of sexual assault.56 Taken together, these notions lay a foundation for
discrediting complaints of sexual assault.
It is important to distinguish between the fantasy myth and the
fabrication myth in this context because of the supposed support for the
fantasy myth in psychology theory. As Torrey suggests, "dubious psy-
choanalytic theory has profoundly imprinted the notion that false charges
are rooted in women's fantasies of rape. '57 This dubious psychoanalytic
theory had its beginnings with Freud and was carried on and expanded by
his disciples.5 Despite current rejection or reinterpretation of Freudian
doctrine, however, the notion of the "lying, hysterical, fantasizing
female...persists even in contemporary consciousness." 59
54. Marsh, Geist and Caplan, supra, note 30 at 60.
55. Brownmiller, supra, note 7 at 315.
56. Edwards, supra, note 24 at 99.
57. Torrey, supra, note 4 at 1026.
58. Brownmiller, supra, note 7 at 317.
59. Edwards, supra, note 24 at 134.
Psychiatric Evidence of Sexual Assault Victims
The myth that women actually fantasize about sexual assault is
grounded in part on a failure to distinguish between seduction fantasies
and fears of sexual assault. At least one study suggests that what have
been identified as rape fantasies were either rape nightmares or fantasies
of seduction.O So-called fantasies of rape were in fact fantasies of
seduction in which the women wanted to have sex with the subject of the
fantasy. On the other hand, dreams or fantasies of forced sex were in fact
nightmares and were accompanied by feelings of fear, not desire.6
While the fabrication myth suggests that women purposefully lie
about sexual assault for various "rational" reasons, the fantasy myth
suggests that the woman is subject to psychological forces beyond her
control that lead her, not to lie, but to misperceptive reality. This myth is
particularly insidious because it is rooted in a "construct of woman [that]
was saturated with a belief in gynaecological determinism from which no
woman could escape. '62 It is rooted in an image of woman as determined
by her physiological difference. Edwards documents the history of
medical and legal discourse regarding female sexuality and concludes
that:
the issues of false accusation, female masochism and female sexual
fantasy have become so readily assimilated into legal practice that they
often go unnoticed. Yet the medico-legal discourse has had profound
consequences for the routine management of the rape complainant ever
since the early nineteenth century.63
Freudian psychoanalytic theory, despite having been largely discredited
in contemporary psychology and psychiatry, continues to have influence
over the institutional response to the sexual assault complainant. In this
context, the introduction of psychiatric history evidence in the sexual
assault trial reflects a belief in the rape fantasy myth. Such evidence is
particularly dangerous as it suggests that the woman does not know her
own mind.
D. Psychiatric history, evidence, and mythology
Thus far I have described the myths regarding women and sexual assault
that make discrediting the victim a successful defence strategy in a sexual
assault trial. The pervasiveness of the myths means that the credibility of
the victim is a primary issue in the trial of a sexual assault complaint.
60. Torrey, supra, note 4 at 1026; Taylor, supra, note 45 at 113.
61. Ibid.
62. Supra, note 24 at 99.
63. Ibid., at 135.
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Moreover, I have suggested that the introduction of evidence of a sexual
assault complainant's psychiatric history reinforces these myths in the
courtroom setting. The acceptance of this type of evidence is based on the
assumption that a complainant's character is in issue and that the accused
must be protected from the lying or fantasizing female. The introduction
of psychiatric history evidence, as a subset of character eviderice, has a
dual effect. It is part of the basic attack-the-victim strategy, similar to
questioning regarding sexual history, and, at the same time, it carries with
it the suggestion that there is a psychiatric basis for the "false" accusation.
There is no need for the defence to explicitly articulate the myth it
seeks to invoke. The mythology is continually operative within thejustice
system's response to the sexual assault complainant. The mere introduc-
tion of psychiatric history evidence is enough to activate it.
PART III: Sex-Bias in Psychiatry and Psychology
Psychiatric evidence is introduced into the courtroom along with all of the
sexism inherent in the discipline of psychiatry. Several scholarly works
have identified and documented the sex bias that historically, and
currently, characterizes psychiatric views of women. 64 The conclusions
of these studies provide the foundation for feminist critique of psychiatry.
Forpresent purposes itis sufficientto identify several themes that emerge
from these studies.
First, the history of psychiatry, from Victorian times through Freud to
the present, shows that the discipline "has gone hand in hand with the rest
of the medical profession in supporting existing views of women."6
Psychiatry is conditioned by and reflective of the social context in which
it exists and develops. "Where women are concerned, most psychiatric
theories and practices validate the male as prototype...and reflect descrip-
tions and prescriptions based on archetypal images. '66
Second, psychiatry is "a force of social control" thatreinforces socially
determined sex roles by labelling as deviant and, if deemed necessary,
hospitalizing, women who do not conform to their prescribed roles.67
"Much psychiatric theory containing images of women is based on
64. See for example E. Showalter, The Female Malady (New York: Penguin, 1985) and P.
Chesler, Women and Madness (New York: Avon Books, 1972).
65. Steen, "Historical Perspectives on Women and Mental Illness and Prevention of depres-
sion in Women, Using a FeministFramework" (1991),12 Issues in Mental Health Nursing 359,
at 365.
66. Ibid.
67. P.S. Penfold and G.A. Walker, "The Psychiatric Paradox and Women" (1986),5 Can. J.
of Community Mental Health 9, at 9.
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archetypes and stereotypes of 'good' and 'bad' women. '6 Thus, not only
has psychiatry accepted traditional sex roles for women, it has reinforced
those roles by identifying conforming behaviour as good and deviating
behaviour as bad.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the mentally healthy adult is
defined by clinicians as equivalent to the mentally healthy man rather
than the mentally healthy woman. A recent study, involving psychia-
trists, psychologists and social workers, found that the subjects generally
agreed about the characteristic attributes of the mentally healthy man,
woman and adult, independent of sex. What it found, however, was that
"descriptions of a mentally healthy adult independent of sex closely
matched the description of a healthy man but not that of a healthy
woman."69 What this suggests is that women are caught in a no win
situation. In conforming to the mentally healthy woman image, they
deviate from that of the mentally healthy adult.
This sex biased classification of mental disorder is present within the
DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), the
"bible" of mental disorders.7" Larkin and Caplan point out that as the
psychiatric establishment is dominated by men, definitions of normalcy
are based on male characteristics and that these definitions have been
institutionalized in the DSM. The apparent scientific objectivity and
medical basis of the DSM hides "a nest of value judgements" and
subjectivity.7' "From this [male dominated psychiatric] perspective much
of what has been determined to constitute psychological pathology is
linked to females' behaviour. 'T2 Larkin and Caplan point to the inclusion
of self-defeating personality disorder (SDPD) in the DSM as an example
of the labelling of traditional female behaviour as pathological. A
criterion of the disorder, originally called masochistic personality disor-
der, is the "sacrifice of own interests for the sake of others." As Caplan
and Larkin point out, this is a traditional female behaviour and may in fact
be an attempt, on the part of an abused woman to protect herself and her
children from an abusive partner.73 What may be traditional or self-
protective behaviour is labelled as indicative of mental or personality
disorder.
68. Penfold and Walker, supra, note 67 at 11.
69. Russell, "Psychiatric Diagnosis and the Oppression of Women" (1985), 31 Int. J. of
Social Psychology 298, at 299.
70. J. Larkin and P.J. Caplan, "The Gatekeeping Process of the DSM" (1992), 11 Can. J. of
Community Mental Health 17, at 18.
7 1. Supra, note 69 at 299.
72. Ibid.
73. Supra, note 70 at 19.
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Against this background of sex-bias, it is not surprising that legal
scholars, judges and defence counsel have turned to psychiatry and
psychology to support their arguments about sexual assault. As Taylor
points out, they have generally found a sympathetic ear.74 She suggests
that a review of medical literature of the last one hundred years discloses
a general consensus amongst medical writers that rape complaints are
frequently unfounded and that women are likely to fabricate or fantasize
the assault.75
To summarize, the preceding discussion establishes several proposi-
tions relevant to the use of victim psychiatric history evidence in the
sexual assault trial. First, because much of psychiatric theory is based on
images of "good" and "bad" women, psychiatric history evidence may be
used to invoke the bad-women-can't-be-raped myth. Second, because the
fantasy myth is supported by dubious, but still influential, psychoanalytic
theory regarding women's psychology, the introduction of psychiatric
evidence draws upon and reinforces that myth. Third, because psychiatric
definitions of normalcy and pathology are sex-biased (constructing
women's behaviour as pathological) psychiatric evidence may introduce
a false identification of pathology.
Further, psychiatric evidence carries with it the presumed credibility
of scientific evidence. As the following discussion of the caselaw will
indicate, the potential danger of this evidence has not been addressed by
the courts.
PART IV: Case Law on Admissibility
Itshouldbe noted that the caselaw dealing with the admissibility evidence
of the psychiatric history of a victim or a witness is scant. Recent cases
such as R. v. Ross and R. v. Nickerson,75a however, indicate that the
introduction of psychiatric history evidence may become a more com-
mon phenomenon. As I have suggested, since the use of sexual history
evidence is restricted, defence counsel may turn to psychiatric history for
evidence with which to attack the credibility of sexual assault complain-
ants. Because of this possibility, it is essential that the potential dangers
of this evidence be recognized and addressed. What little caselaw there
is tends to deal with the usefulness of the evidence to the trier of fact and
the right of the accused to make full answer and defence without
consideration of its potential misleading or discriminatory effect.
74. Taylor, supra, note 45 at 76.
75. Ibid.
75a. (1993), 121 N.S.R. (2d) 314 (N.S.C.A.).
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Psychiatric evidence may take any one, or any combination of, three
forms. It may be introduced through the testimony of a psychiatrist,
through the introduction of records of a complainant's psychiatric his-
tory, or simply through the cross-examination of the complainant herself.
Although, in the final analysis the issue comes down to a determination
of relevance, I will consider the rules governing each type of evidence in
turn.
A. Expert Opinion
The key Canadian case dealing with the admissibility of psychiatric
opinion evidence regarding the credibility of a witness is R. v. Hawke.76
The charge inHawke was murder and the psychiatric evidence introduced
was regarding the chief Crown witness who was intimately involved with
the accused and had apparently been present when the alleged murder was
committed. The witness had been an involuntary patient at a psychiatric
facility just prior to the events leading to the murder charge. In consider-
ing the trial judge's exclusion of psychiatric opinion evidence regarding
the witness, the Court of Appeal first found that the trial judge had erred
in failing to properly distinguish between issues of competence and
credibility.77 The Court then went on to consider the issue of psychiatric
opinion going to credibility. In so doing, the Court applied the principle
enunciated in Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Com' r.78 In Toohey, the
House of Lords stated:
Human evidence shares the frailties of those who give it. It is subject to
many cross-currents such as partiality, prejudice, self-interest and, above
all, imagination and inaccuracy. Those are matters with which the jury,
helped by cross-examination and common sense, must do their [sic] best.
But when a witness through physical (in which I include mental) disease
or abnormality is not capable of giving a true or reliable account to thejury,
it must surely be allowable for medical science to reveal this vital hidden
fact to them.79
In Hawke, the Court of Appeal held that, based on Toohey, the trial
judge's exclusion of the expert evidence was in error regardless whether
the evidence went to competence or credibility.
In R. v. Desmoulin, the accused was charged with the murder of the
child of the woman with whom he was living. The chief Crown witness
was the child's mother. The defence sought to introduce evidence of a
76. (1975), 22 C.C.C. (2d) 22 (Ont.C.A.).
77. Ibid., at 26.
78. [1965] 1 All E.R. 506 (H.L.).
79. Ibid., at 512.
432 The Dalhousie Law Journal
psychiatric resident who had treated the witness and was of the opinion
that the witness was mentally retarded. It was also intended that he would
testify as to the circumstances of her hospitalization and to her fabricating
stories while in hospital. It was held that the doctor's "evidence did not
provide a foundation for the reception of medical evidence relating to [the
witness's] credibility under the principle enunciated in Hawke."80 The
court held that there was no evidence that the mental retardation of the
witness affected her reliability as a witness. Psychiatric evidence, then,
must be of a mental disorder or deficiency that clearly affects the
reliability of the witness's testimony.
The Toohey principle was also applied inR. v. French, a murder case,
where it was held that the mental disorder about which the psychiatrist is
to give evidence must be hidden.81 In French, psychiatric opinion
evidence was sought to be introduced by the defence regarding a Crown
witness who was a friend of the wife of the deceased. The witness testified
at trial regarding a conversation she had overheard in which the accused
and the wife of the deceased discussed a life insurance policy held by the
deceased. A psychiatrist, who had not treated or interviewed the witness
but who had observed her testimony and who had her hospital records,
testified that she suffered from a character disorder and was capable of
lying on the stand.82 The court stated that there was no "hidden fact for
medical science to reveal" and that the frailties of the witness's evidence
would be apparent to the jury without the psychiatrist's testimony.83 The
psychiatrist's evidence was excluded.
A similar ruling was made more recently in R. v. Osolin where the
psychiatric evidence was held to have been properly excluded by the trial
judge.84 In Osolin, the accused was convicted at trial by ajury of one count
of sexual assault and one count of kidnapping. The defence had tendered
evidence of a psychiatrist who was prepared to testify that the complain-
ant suffered from mental disorder which would affect the reliability of her
evidence. The trial judge held that the psychiatrist's evidence did not
show an incapacity to tell the truth, but rather only a capacity to lie, which
is a matter for the jury.85
80. (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 517 (Ont.C.A.) at 522.
81. (1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 203 (Ont. C.A.) at 212.
82. Ibid., at 209.
83. Ibid.
84. (1991), 10 C.R. (4th) 159 (B.C.C.A.).
85. Ibid., at 189.
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Finally, in R. v. Julien, a psychiatrist's evidence that the key Crown
witness suffered from hysteria 6 and thus had a tendency to fabricate and
invent, if not outright lie, was held to be admissible.17 In that case, the
accused, having been charged with two counts of first degree murder
arising out of the setting of a fire, was convicted at trial of one count of
second degree murder and one count of manslaughter. The appellant
contended that evidence of a psychiatrist as to the credibility of the
principal Crown witness, who had been with one of the deceased on the
night of the fire, and who had spoken to the accused before the fire, was
improperly excluded at trial. The psychiatrist had treated the witness for
several years prior to the trial and testified in a voir dire that the witness
suffered from hysteria and as a result had a tendency to fabricate and
invent." L'Heureux-Dub6 J.A., as she then was, emphasized that the
decision to admit or exclude this type of evidence is to be left in the hands
of the trial judge to be made with regard to the particular facts of the case.89
The question, she points out, is one of relevance and that in this instance
the jury ought to have been informed of the disorder to enable it to "render
an enlightened verdict." 90
The principle which can be extracted from this line of cases is this:
expert opinion evidence regarding the credibility of the witness is
admissible where it provides to the trier of fact a hidden fact disclosed by
medical science that would be necessary to make a proper determination
of the reliability of the witness' testimony. In addition, the question of
relevance must be determined by the trial judge based on the facts of the
particular case.
The danger, of course, is that in both the psychiatric determination of
a hidden medical fact and in the determination of relevance, myths will
be determinative. Although the charge in Julien was murder, not sexual
assault, the case is a prime example of this danger. The doctor's diagnosis
of hysteria was based, in part, on his observations of the female witness'
"exaggeration" of her physical ailments (removal of a breast, uterine
cancer, a cardiac complaint and distension of the large intestine) as well
as on her apparent discomfort with being questioned by a lawyer.91
Although it is perhaps imprudent to draw any conclusions from the scant
facts available in the case report, it is at least possible that the "diagnosis"
86. The etymology of the term "hysteria" and the belief in the gynaecological foundation of
the disorder makes it particularly offensive.
87. (1981), 57 C.C.C. (2d) 463 (Que.C.A.), at 472.
88. Ibid., at 472.
89. Ibid., at 477.
90. Ibid., at 478.
91. Ibid.,at471 and473.
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is based on a misunderstanding of what might be a "reasonable" response
for this woman in this context. Moreover, it is doubtful that her response
to her ailments has any relevance to the credibility of her testimony in a
murder trial. It is indeed interesting to note that in all of these cases, all
murder charges except Osolin, the witness whose credibility is attacked
by the use of psychiatric opinion is a woman.
B. Records
The production of psychiatric treatment records has been dealt with
primarily by weighing the interests of justice against the privacy rights of
the witness. Medical records are clearly admissible in criminal proceed-
ings.92 It has been held by the Supreme Court of Canada that provincial
legislation dealing with the confidentiality of records cannot fetter the
administration of criminal justice.93 Therefore, the question becomes
whether the production of therecords is required in the interests ofjustice.
In R. v. Ryan, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, without citing case
law, held that social work files related to the sexual assault complainant
had to be produced in the interests ofjustice. The trial judge, after reading
the complainant's files, found that they contained information necessary
for the accused to make full answer and defence but were also privileged.
He then entered a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal pointed out
that the accused has a constitutionally protected right to make full answer
and defence and that this, plus the societal interest in "the correct disposal
of litigation,"94 must override the value of confidentiality. It is interesting
to note the Court of Appeal's comments regarding the interests of the
complainant in this case:
Presumably she has a vital interest in having her complaint pursued and
disposed of, else she would not have made it in the first place. It is
reasonable to assume she is prepared to run the risks of disclosure that may
be made from her files in the interest of a "correct disposal of the litigation"
she has caused to be started."
The files were held not to be privileged. With regard to admissibility of
the evidence the court states: "The trial Judge is able to apply the well-
established rules and tests to determine whether any given piece of
evidence is relevant. 96
92. Supra, note 81 at 214.
93. R. v. Albright (1987), 60 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
94. (1991), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 226 (N.S.C.A.) at229.
95. Ibid., at 229.
96. Ibid., at 230.
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In R. v. Coon, the defence sought the production of the sexual assault
complainant's psychiatric hospital records. The Ontario Mental Health
Act requires that records be disclosed only if disclosure is essential in the
interests of justice.97 The Ontario Court (General Division) set out a list
of factors to be considered in determining whether the defence had
provided a sufficient foundation for the production of records. The court
stated:
While I do not pretend that this list is exhaustive some of thefactors that
may be considered as to whether a substantial foundation has been
established are (1) the nature and seriousness of the offence; (2) the
importance of the witness to establishing the guilt of the accused; (3) the
proximity of the mental disorder to the date of the offence; (4) the existence
of evidence to suggest a motive to fabricate; (5) criminal antecedents of the
witness; (6) the mode of life or other discreditable conduct which may tend
to discredit the testimony; (7) evidence of bizarre or incompetent
behaviour."
These factors would be used to determine whether there is at least a basis
of relevance to the evidence to warrant the production of the records. The
danger, of course, is that the determination of relevance that would render
the evidence admissible and sanction the order for production of the
records will be made with reference to myths. Indeed, the presence of the
myths is apparent in the factors listed. In particular, reference to possible
motive to fabricate on the part of the complainant suggests the influence
of the fabrication myth. The factors relating to the complainant's criminal
antecedents and mode of life or discreditable conduct suggest the possi-
bility of using psychiatric records to attack her character and thus place
her in the category of unprotected "bad" women. Finally, consideration
of what is bizarre or incompetent behaviour leaves the door open to sex-
biased determinations of what might be the appropriate response of a
woman to a sexual assault similar to those used to support the now
abrogated doctrine of recent complaint. In Coon, the court ordered the
disclosure of the records to defence counsel, in part, on thebasis that there
was evidence that the complainant had "exaggerated" sexual abuse on the
part of her adoptive father and that there was evidence of criminal activity
and discreditable conduct on the part of the complainant.99
97. (1991), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 146 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 157.
98. Ibid., at 157.
99. Ibid., at 158.
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C. Cross-examination
As a basic principle, it is fair to say, that the only limit on the right of
defence counsel to cross-examine a witness is relevance. Moreover,
particularly where the purpose of the questioning is to "test" credibility,
the concept of relevance is broadly construed. As stated in Osolin, "That
which is relevant to the credibility of a witness may be asked."'1' The
British Columbia Court of Appeal, in Osolin held that the trial judge's
restriction of cross-examination of the complainant on mental health
records was in error. The trial judge had ruled that defence counsel could
use the records in cross-examination only where they disclosed a prior
inconsistent statement. He had ruled that to allow defence counsel to
cross-examine the complainant on the basis of her mental health records
in general would be a violation of her right to privacy. The Court of
Appeal held that in deternining the limits of cross-examination the issue
is relevance. As it was impossible to know what questions defence
counsel would have asked had it been permitted, the Court of Appeal
could not decide on the issue.101
It is interesting to note that the defence in Osolin sought to cross-
examine the complainant regarding an argument that had occurred
between her and her mother at the psychiatric ward of a hospital to which
the complainant had been committed following the alleged incident. The
defence submitted that the argument was relevant to the defence theory
that the complainant was "fabricating her story of sexual assault in order
to prevent further confrontation with her parents."' 0 The image of the
woman under surveillance was thus sought to be invoked in a case where
there was evidence sufficient for a jury to convict the accused of
kidnapping and sexual assault.
D. Summary
In summary, then, the admissibility of psychiatric history evidence -
whether in the form of expert opinion, records or elicited from the
complainant in cross-examination-will be determined on the basis of its
relevance. The issue of relevance and the operation of sex-bias in its
determination is the subject of the following section of this paper.
100. Supra, note 84 at 36.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., at 38.
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PART V: Relevance
The statutory restrictions on cross-examination regarding the past sexual
conduct of the complainant, in section 276 of the Criminal Code, were
intended to be "an exhaustive list of situations in which such evidence
could be relevant."'' 3 These provisions were struck down by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme for violating of the
accused's right to make full answer and defence. In Seaboyer, L'Heureux-
Dub6 J., in dissent, states: "Evidence that is excluded by these provisions
is simply, in a myth- and stereotype-free decision-making context,
irrelevant."'1 4 Although the majority refuses to accept that the evidence
excluded by s.276 is in all cases irrelevant, it does refer to the evidence
of the complainant's past sexual conduct as often of "limited probative
value."'10 5 The problem, argues McLachlin J., is that the provision "fails
to distinguish between the different purposes for which the evidence may
be tendered" and therefore excludes evidence for "purposes where the
evidence would not be misleading, but truly relevant and helpful.' '0 6
Although the evidence may be irrelevant to the general credibility of the
complainant, the court suggests, it may be relevant to show bias or motive
to fabricate, the physical condition of the victim, or a pattern of conduct
analogous to similar fact evidence.0 7 These purposes, the majority
claims, would be relevant to the determination of the truth. L'Heureux-
Dub6 clearly disagrees. The differences between the majority and dissent
in Seaboyer can, in fact, be reduced to a disagreement about the possible
relevance of past sexual conduct evidence introduced through cross-
examination.
It is important to recognize here that the distinction between relevant
and irrelevant uses of prior sexual conduct evidence, as articulated by the
court in Seaboyer, is not as clear as is suggested. Indeed, the distinction
between evidence going to credibility and evidence going to motive to
fabricate or pattern of conduct is a spurious one. Whatever the avowed
purpose of the introduction of such evidence, it is meant to show that the
complainant's story is not to be believed. As such it is grounded in the
myth that women frequently and successfully fabricate complaints of
103. Shilton and Derrick, supra, note 2 at 113.
104. Supra, note 36 at 198.
105. Ibid., at 134.
106. Ibid., at 145.
107. Ibid., at 142 and 143.
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sexual assault. Moreover, it is based on the assumption that the sexual
assault trial will inevitably be a credibility contest. As I have suggested,
this too, may be a myth.
An example of this, regarding psychiatric history evidence, may be
found in the recent decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v.
Ross."°8 In allowing an appeal based on fresh evidence from the
complainant's former psychiatrist, the court stated:
The evidence of Dr. Hansen is, in my opinion, relevant in that it bears on
the believability of the evidence of the complainant. It does not relate to
credibility in the ordinary sense because the evidence does not suggest that
his former patient may be telling an untruth. It merely presents a psychi-
atric reason for the complainant having given a version of the facts which
she may believe to be true but which may not, in fact, represent what
actually occurred. 109
The distinction between credibility in the "ordinary sense" and the issue
of whether or not the story given by the complainant represents "what
actually occurred" is difficult to see. The Court of Appeal points out that
all counsel agree that the jury trial was "properly conducted and that there
was ample evidence to support the conviction that resulted." However,
the Court adds:
If on the other hand the jury had believed Mr. Ross rather than the
complainant or had a reasonable doubt, the verdict would have had to be
one of acquittal. Credibility was the issue of vital importance."0
The introduction of psychiatric evidence in this case, the content of which
is unavailable because it was heard by the Court of Appeal in camera, is
clearly for the purpose of showing that the complainant's story is not
credible.
A. Sex-bias in the determination of relevance
As the admissibility of psychiatric evidence will be decided based on a
determination of relevance, it is important to investigate further the
relationship between relevance and the myths and stereotypes discussed
thus far.
Sheehy states: "The legal test of relevance is whether a reasonable trier
of fact could find the proffered evidence helpful as tending to shed light
on some matter at issue in the case.""' She suggests that, inrelationto the
introduction of past sexual conduct evidence the difficulty is that the
108. (1993), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 234 (N.S.C.A.).
109. Ibid., at 238.
110. Ibid., at 235.
111. Sheehy, supra, note 28 at 753.
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determination of relevance is "informed by beliefs which the dominant
culture labels as 'truth'."" 2 This statement can be applied equally to
evidence of the psychiatric history of the sexual assault complainant. The
question of relevance is decided based on beliefs rather than truth.
In an article dealing with the nature of judicial decision-making,
MacGuigan states that in their undeniable role as law-makers judges
cannot apply their own "individual sense of justice.""' 3 Judges, he
suggests, cannot place themselves above their community and must
apply the "accepted standards of the community", "the mores of the
times.""' 4 MacGuigan submits that "it is only because judges are true
members of their society that they are able to be its spokesmen [sic], its
poets.""' 5 Of course, in making determinations of relevance, that is
precisely the problem. Judges internalize and reflect the beliefs and
values of our male-dominated culture.
In reference to sexual history evidence, Sheehy states:
The beliefs which give life to our notions of "relevance" are reflective of
a patriarchal culture.... [They] are not only without empirical foundation:
they also systematically deny control and credibility to those who do not
belong to the dominant culture. Even more problematic is the fact that
these beliefs are insidious because they are taken for granted and are
therefore almost irresistible to the trier of fact who has absorbed our
culture. Seen in this context, the legal construct of "relevance" actually
projects an unarticulated political agenda which involves the reinforcing
of mythologies about rape and women's sexuality." 6
This statement may be applied equally to the issue of psychiatric history
evidence. To it must be added sex-biased notions of mental health
reinforced by the mental health disciplines and professionals. With the
introduction of psychiatric history evidence, societal mythologies about
women and sexual assault are supported by a sex-biased discipline that
purports to be scientific and objective.
B. Power to exclude relevant evidence.
A possible solution to the problem may be found in looking beyond the
question of relevance and considering the probative value of the evidence
tendered as weighed against the danger of introducing myths into the
112. Sheehy, supra, note 28 at 753.
113. MacGuigan, "Sources of Judicial Decision Making and Judicial Activism," in Mahoney
and Martin (eds.) Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 31.
114. Ibid., at 32.
115. Ibid.,at33.
116. Sheehy, supra, note 28 at 756.
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judicial decision-making process. In other contexts, the power of a court
to exclude relevant evidence on the grounds that its probative value is
outweighed by the negative effect it has on the trier of fact's ability to
make an objective determination of truth has been endorsed.
The issue in R. v. Corbett was the admissibility of the accused's
criminal record under s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act. In that case, the
Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that "a salutary judicial discretion
exists to ensure that this otherwise relevant and admissible evidence will
be excluded where the interests of justice so require."117 In Corbett, the
Court confirmed the judicial discretion to exclude evidence if its preju-
dicial effect outweighed its probative value. This discretion had been
severely restricted in R. v. Wray.118 LaForest J., dissenting on other
grounds, hinted that, contrary ter Wray, and its subsequent interpretation,
the circumstances where otherwise admissible evidence could be ex-
cluded may not be limited to cases where the probative value is "trifling"
and the prejudicial effect great.119 Without definitively confirming a
broader discretion, LaForest suggests that the discretion ought to be
exercised with an eye to ensuring that the trial is fair. This view was
confirmed in R. v. Potvin, although the breadth of the general discretion
was not articulated. 20
This general discretion to exclude evidence that is otherwise admis-
sible because its prejudicial effect would outweigh its probative value
offers a mechanism for arguing that psychiatric history evidence ought to
be excluded in a given case. However, it should be remembered that the
bias and stereotypical thinking that determines the relevance decision
will be active in the probative value versus prejudice balancing act.
Moreover, while affirming the general discretion to exclude, LaForest
and Dickson (for the majority) enunciate a fundamental principle of
inclusion. Dickson states:
I agree with my colleague La Forest J. that basic principles of evidence
embody an inclusionary policy which would permit into evidence every-
thing logically probative of some fact in issue subject to the recognized
rules of exclusion and exceptions thereto. Thereafter the question is one of
weight. ... If error is to be made, it should be on the side of inclusion rather
than exclusion, and our efforts, in my opinion, consistent with the ever-
increasing open-ness of our society, should be toward admissibility unless
a very clear ground of policy or law dictates exclusion.12'
117. (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
118. [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.).
119. Supra, note 117 at 435.
120. (1989), 68 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
121. Supra, note 117 at404.
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Given this inclusionary policy and the recognition that "discretion has not
protected women" in sexual assault trials 122 we should not place our faith
in this power to exclude. This is true despite the clearly demonstrable
danger that the introduction of psychiatric history evidence will foster the
operation of myths that skew the decision making process.
Cogent evidence regarding the influence of victim history evidence on
jurors provided by mock jury studies 23 may not be sufficient to convince
a court of the overriding discriminatory effect of such evidence. In
Corbett, Dickson C.J.C. payed little heed to similar studies regarding the
inability of juries to make the distinction between evidence going to
credibility and that going to guilt. Instead, he confirmed "our strong faith
in juries"'124 and stated that "it would be wrong to make too much of the
risk that the jury might use the evidence for an improper purpose."''
C. The fair trial
It is important to note that both Corbett and Potvin dealt with evidence the
admission of which mightrender the trial unfair to the accused. In Potvin,
the issue was the admissibility of testimony taken at a preliminary inquiry
where the witness was no longer available at the time of trial. After
finding that the accused has a constitutional right to the opportunity to
cross-examine Crown witnesses, the court held that there is a judicial
discretion to exclude the testimony. In exercising this discretion the trial
judge is to consider the "'two competing and frequently conflicting
concerns' of fair treatment of the accused and society's interest in the
admission of probative evidence in order to get at the truth of the matter
in issue.' 26 In Corbett, too, La Forest J. states that the notion of a fair trial
includes consideration of society's interests. He states:
But fairness implies and in my view demands, consideration also of the
interests of the state as representing the public. Likewise, the principles of
fundamental justice operate to protect the integrity of the system itself,
recognizing the legitimate interests not only of the accused but also of the
accuser.
27
122. T.B. Dawson, "Sexual Assault Law and Past Sexual Conduct of the Primary Witness:
The Construction of Relevance" (1987-88), 2 C.J.W.L. 310, at 329.
123. See, for example, studies quoted supra, note 4, at 1047 and 1054; and supra, note 2, at
114. See also S.M. Kassin et al., "Dirty Tricks of Cross-Examination" (1990), 14 Law and
Human Behaviour 373.
124. Supra, note 117 at 402.
125. Ibid., at 401.
126. Supra, note 120 at 212.
127. Supra, note 117 at443.
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L'Heureux-Dub6 J., in dissent in Seaboyer, also points to the societal
interest in maintaining the integrity of the trial process to be considered
under s.1 1 and s.7 of the Charter. She goes on to suggest that:
interpreting the Charter in a manner that systematically excludes consid-
erations of the harm done by evidence sought to be elicited by the accused
may, ironically, operate to undermine and trivialize notions of fairness.121
Her view, unfortunately, is not shared by the majority. While recognizing
that "s.7 reflects a variety of societal and individual interests"'129 the
majority declares that "a measure which denies the accused the right to
make full answer and defence would violate s.7 in any event."'30 The
difference between the majority and the dissent, as I have suggested, lies
in their respective views on the relevance of the evidence excluded by the
impugned provision. There is a difference, too, in their respective views
on the content and status of the right to make full answer and defence.
For the majority, the accused has the right to introduce any and all
evidence that might lead to an acquittal.' Moreover, this right is seen as
overriding. Indeed, the majority invokes the ghosts of Donald Marshall
and the Birmingham Six to buttress its overriding concern that the
accused be allowed to establish its defence. 32 The supremacy of the
accused's right to make full answer and defence is found, too, in Coon
dealing with the production of psychiatric records of the sexual assault
complainant. The court states:
First, in ordering production a balance must be struck between the right of
the accused to full answer and defence and the right of the complainant (the
disclosure of whose records are at issue) to privacy and confidentiality
which is embodied in the legislation [Mental Health Act]. Secondly, the
right of the accused to full answer and defence will prevail if a sufficient
foundation is laid to enable the judge to determine that disclosure is
necessary in the interest of justice.'33
In Hawke, the Court rejected the suggestion that defence counsel's bid to
introduce psychiatric evidence, in an effort to undermine the credibility
of the witness, was an "unwarranted attack" on the witness. There it was
held that to have "acquiesced in the evidence of Miss Thomas as being
that of a thoroughly credible witness would have been a complete
abdication of the role and duty of defence counsel.' ' 34
128. Supra, note 36 at 215.
129. Ibid., at 133.
130. Ibid., at 134.
131. Ibid., at 137.
132. Ibid., at 135.
133. Supra, note 97 at 152.
134. Supra, note 76 at 52.
Psychiatric Evidence of Sexual Assault Victims
It seems, then, that the discretion to exclude evidence the negative
effect of which might outweigh its probative value will function only in
favour of the accused. As the majority states in Seaboyer, although there
is indeed a discretion to exclude otherwise relevant evidence, "Canadian
courts ... have been extremely cautious in restricting the power of the
accused to call evidence in his or her defence...."I35 As a result, I would
posit that arguments that psychiatric evidence ought to be excluded on the
basis that its discriminatory effect outweighs it probative value are likely
to fail whether made in the lower courts or at the Supreme Court of
Canada.
What is needed is a redefinition of the right to make a full answer and
defence with full recognition of the equality issues inherent in the sexual
assault trial. Unfortunately such arguments failed to convince the major-
ity in Seaboyer although they were clearly articulated in the judgement
of L'Heureux-Dub6. L'Heureux-Dub6 makes it clear that the right to
make full answer and defence does not include the right to introduce
irrelevant evidence, nor does it include a right to trial based on mythol-
ogy. 136 Moreover, her section 1 analysis recognizes that the objective of
the elimination of sex discrimination in the adjudication of sexual assault
complaints is buttressed by the equality guarantees in s. 15 and s.28 of the
Charter .137
Sexual assault must be recognized as an equality issue.'38 Unfortu-
nately, the majority in Seaboyer did not perceive it as such.'39 As Kathleen
Lahey points out, in order for the law to give full recognition to equality,
it must be grounded in a theory of inequality. 40 This approach, she
suggests:
would require judges to ask whether the rule or practice that is being
challenged contributes to the actual inequality of women, and whether
changing the rule or practice would actually produce an improvement in
the material conditions of the specific woman or women before them.
The methodology of judicial analysis will have to change in order to
make such a shift in focus possible. Judges will have to begin to listen to
women, to what they have to say -as witnesses, as experts, as lawyers - and
they will have to ascribe as much validity and importance to that viewpoint
135. Supra, note 36 at 139.
136. Ibid., at 210.
137. Ibid., at 216.
138. Shilton and Derrick, supra, note 2 at 112.
139. Ibid., at 117.
140. K. Lahey, "Feminist Theories of (In)Equality" in Mahoney and Martin (eds.), Equality
and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at 83.
444 The Dalhousie Law Joumal
as they do to the men's voices they are used to hearing. Judges will have
to insist on contextualizing the issues they are analyzing, taking into
account the history of the rule or practice in question, the realities of the
social, economic, and legal relations that surround it, and the fact that the
private oppression of women has been very much a part of the public
agenda.1
4
'
This shift in focus to a recognition of equality and the particular context
of the rule is required in judicial decisions about the admissibility of
evidence of the sexual assault complainant's psychiatric history. Judges
must be cognizant of the power of the myths that surround sexual assault
complaints and the contributions that psychiatric and psychological
theory have made to these myths.
D. The victimization spiral
In addition, judges must be aware of what I call the victimization spiral.
There is an undeniable link, supported by empirical studies, between
childhood sexual abuse and mental health difficulties in adulthood. It has
been shown that "childhood molestation is associated with multiple
short- and long-term psychological difficulties.11 42 Among the problems
that have been repeatedly associated with a history of sexual abuse are:
low self-esteem and guilt, anxiety and depression, interpersonal dysfunc-
tion, eating disorders, substance abuse and a propensity towards sui-
cide. 43 Any of these problems might lead a woman to seek the help of
mental health professionals.
Moreover, there is a clear link between past sexual abuse and further
victimization. One study suggests that women who have suffered child-
hood sexual abuse are 2.4 times more likely to berevictimized as adults."4
Speculation about the nature of this link and the construction of causality
is unnecessary for present purposes. However, it is worth quoting an
American. study which concludes:
[Tihe high frequency of adult assault after the onset of mental illness
suggests that in addition to [past] victimization as a predisposing factor,
the mentally ill are more vulnerable to victimization because of their
illness.... It is interesting to note that the victimization that occurred after
141. Supra, note 40.
142. J. Briere, "Methodological Issues in the Study of Sexual Abuse Effects" (1992), 60
J. of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 196, at 196.
143. Ibid. See also Wyatt, Guthrie and Notgrass, "Differential Effects of Women's Child
Sexual Abuse and Subsequent Revictimization" (1992), 60 J. of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 167.
144. Wyatt, Guthrie and Notgrass, ibid., at 170.
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the onset of mental illness was most likely perpetrated by a stranger or
casual acquaintance; whereas...assaults that occurred prior to the illness
were more likely to involve a family member. 45
There appears to be a link, then, between childhood victimization and
revictimization that goes beyond the predisposing factors identified in
one study as "low self esteem and a perceived inability to control what
happens to one's body and to develop nonexploitative relationships that
can increase the likelihood of revictimization.' ' 46 As Derrick and Shilton
point out, disabled women are more vulnerable to sexual violence: "But
the problem clearly goes beyond that; the multiple disadvantage can also
be a motivating factor in a sexual assault."1 47
Whatever the causal relationship, the victimization spiral is clear.
Childhood victimization is linked to psychological and psychiatric diffi-
culties, which in turn are linked to further victimization. The cycle is
complete when the operation of myths and stereotypes leads to the
discrediting of the victim's complaint. In a sense, the childhood victim-
ization is brought back to haunt the victim as it nullifies whatever
protection the law would have provided her.
In order for judges to deal adequately and fairly with evidential issues
in sexual assault trials, they must begin thinking from a theory of
inequality. As Lahey suggests, they must ask "does this rule or practice
contribute to the inequality of women." To the extent that routine
introduction of, and admission of, psychiatric history evidence acqui-
esces in and reinforces the application of myths in sexual assault trials, it
contributes to women's inequality. It denies women a fair trial; denies
them full protection of the law as guaranteed by s.15 of the Charter.
Moreover, given the victimization spiral, it denies women who use
mental health services redress and further reinforces their victimization
and double vulnerability. In addition, to the extent that the prospect of the
introduction and disclosure of mental health history discourages women
from reporting sexual assaults it contributes to the vulnerability and
inequality of all women.
145. Jenkins et al., "Circumstances of Sexual and Physical Victimization of Black Psychi-
atric Outpatients", 81 J. of National Medical Association 246, at 251.
146. Wyatt, Guthrie and Notgrass, supra, note 143 at 167.
147. Supra, note 2 at 123.
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Conclusion
I can offer only limited solutions. One would be to enact legislation
similar to the current Criminal Code section that deals with evidence of
past sexual activity. 148 This provision provides a list of factors to be
considered by the trial judge in determining admissibility:
(a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a
full answer and defence;
(b) society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault
cases;
(c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in
arriving at a just determination in the case;
(d) the need to remove from the factfinding process any discriminatory
belief or bias;
(e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice,
sympathy or hostility in the jury;
(f) the potential prejudice to the complainant's personal dignity and the
right of privacy;
(g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal
security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and
(h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice
considers relevant.
The value of these factors is limited by the fact that the question is still to
be determined through the exercise of judicial discretion which carries
with it the application of bias and myth. They do little more than codify
the common law discretion.
An alternative, or additional solution, is to provide expert evidence as
a "method of expanding the lens of legal relevance to include other
experiences that are not reflected in the dominant schemes" as was
allowed in Lavallee. 49 A major problem with this proposed solution,
recognized in relation to evidence of rape trauma syndrome, is that
"syndrome evidence may give sexual assault a psychiatric component
which creates a perception that it is a problem peculiar to women rather
than a violent crime."' 5° The Report of the British Columbia Law Society
recommends the acceptance of such evidence but cautions against
"syndromization."' 51 The syndromization of women's experience denies
it as normal. This process, as I have indicated, is a common feature of
psychiatric discourse and ought not be imported into the law.
148. Supra, note 34 at s. 276(3).
149. M. MacCrimmon, "Developments in theLaw of Evidence: the 1989-90 Term" (1991),
2 (2d) S.C.L.R. 385, at 394.
150. Gender Equality in the Justice System, supra, note 6 at 7-87.
151. Ibid., Recommendation no. 7.78.
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My conclusion is inevitably bleak. The possible solutions held out by
determinations of relevance or the weighing of the discriminatory effect
of psychiatric history evidence against its probative value in the name of
a trial characterized by fairness are elusive. Relevance and probative
value will be determined with reference to the myths and stereotypes of
the dominant culture. The discriminatory effect of the introduction of
psychiatric evidence in a sexual assault trial will not be recognized.
Legislation that would mandate the exclusion of such evidence would no
doubt be struck down as the accused's right to an acquittal eclipses all
other considerations. As a result, I feel the fear and despair that Christine
Boyle and Marilyn MacCrimmon expressed in response to the Seaboyer
decision.12 The cycle of victimization will be entrenched in, and sup-
ported by, our legal system.
The only real solution lies in a "sea-change" in judicial thinking about
women and sexual assault.
152. Boyle and MacCrimmon, "R. v. Seaboyer: a Lost Cause?" (1991), 7 C.R. (4th) 255, at
255.
